Agency, the romance of management pay and an alternative explanation
Workaround: In current version of Panels 3.8, it seems this body field needs to be populated in order for title above to appear. This note is hidden by custom CSS style. Jack Latimer.
This paper outlines a radical explanation of management pay based on claims and positions, which breaks with the functionalist assumptions of academic agency theory focused on actors and functions. The first part of the paper contrasts the discursive construction of the post-1980s shareholder with the pre-1940s rentier, observing that the critique of the rentier developed by Keynes and others raises questions about the position and reward that are relevant to current managers of giant public companies. The second part of the paper situates the pay of giant firm executives, who have received large real increases in their rewards over 20 years, in a broader context that includes those who derive high incomes from positions around (not inside) the giant firm. The aim of the paper is to contribute to a new debate abouthow activity and position can generate high income and wealth and to open out a new agenda for understanding business power and influence in present day capitalism.2006923